Apache Solr can load Java code named in the configuration of an index. That is a feature for people who run their own Solr, and a risk the moment configuration comes from someone you do not fully trust. It has no CVE number. The Opensolr platform does not allow it.
01 · At a glance
02 · What it is
A Solr configuration can point to extra Java libraries with <lib> directives and can name the Java class behind a request handler, a search component or an update processor. Solr loads those classes into its own process when the index starts.
If the same person can place a library next to the configuration and reference it, the code in that library runs as Solr. Scripted update processors have the same effect without a library: the script runs inside Solr at indexing time.
On a server run by one team for itself this is expected behaviour. Where configuration can come from someone you do not fully trust, it has to be treated as code.
03 · Who is affected
- Solr installations that accept configuration uploads, configset archives or Config API calls from users who are not administrators.
- Hosted and internal search platforms that let their users manage index configuration.
04 · How to protect a Solr server
- Treat the permission to change configuration as the permission to run code. Give it only to administrators.
- Inspect uploaded configuration by content, not by file name: refuse archives and binary files, refuse configuration that loads libraries, refuse scripted update processors.
- Disable library loading from configuration where your Solr version offers the switch, and keep plugins in a location only administrators can write to.
- Switch off the Config API for everyone else, and keep Solr behind authentication.
# configuration editing off SOLR_OPTS="$SOLR_OPTS -Ddisable.configEdit=true"
05 · How to check a server
grep -rn '<lib ' /var/solr/data/*/conf/solrconfig.xml grep -rn 'StatelessScriptUpdateProcessorFactory\|ScriptUpdateProcessorFactory' /var/solr/data/*/conf/solrconfig.xml find /var/solr/data -name '*.jar' -o -name '*.class'
Every match is a place where an index configuration brings its own code. Each one should be there because an administrator put it there.
06 · Opensolr and this vulnerability
Status on November 20, 2026. Opensolr does not allow custom Java code to be loaded through the configuration of an Opensolr Index. The control is enforced platform-wide and has been verified on every server. Nothing is required from you.
- Opensolr watches newly published vulnerabilities for every component of the platform, around the clock.
- Each advisory is assessed against the platform as soon as it is published.
- The fix is applied, or the vulnerable condition is closed, and the result is verified before the case is closed.
More on how Opensolr protects your data: Opensolr Trust Center and all security pages. Questions about a vulnerability that is not listed: contact Opensolr.
Background: Apache Solr security page · Securing Solr, Apache Solr Reference Guide.