Loghound parses hostile input by definition. That is not a caveat, it is the job description.
Log lines contain attacker-controlled paths, User-Agents and referrers. The beacon endpoint is a public, unauthenticated write path. Enrichment responses come from third parties. None of it is ever trusted.
cip@opensolr.com with LOGHOUND SECURITY in the subject line
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Useful things to include, in rough order of usefulness: the affected file and line, a minimal reproduction, the version or commit, and what an attacker gets out of it. A proof of concept is welcome and never required — a clear description of the flaw is worth more than a weaponised exploit.
What to expect: acknowledgement within a few days. This is a small project maintained by one person; there is no bug bounty and no service-level agreement, and claiming one would be dishonest. There is no embargo requirement — publish when you think it is right — but a little warning is appreciated so a fix can land alongside the disclosure. Credit in the changelog unless you would rather not be named.
Who Loghound defends against and what it trusts: Threat model. The protection on every surface, the secrets and a hardening checklist: Controls & hardening.
Security
- Reporting a vulnerability
- Threat model
- Controls & hardening